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Abstract
We study the extent to which equilibrium payoffs of discounted repeated games
can be obtained by 1 – memory strategies. We establish the following in games
with perfect (rich) action spaces: First, when the players are sufficiently patient,
the subgame perfect Folk Theorem holds with 1 – memory. Second, for arbitrary
level of discounting, all strictly enforceable subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs can
be approximately supported with 1 – memory if the number of players exceeds two.
Furthermore, in this case all subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs can be approxi-
mately supported by an ε – equilibrium with 1 – memory. In two-player games, the
same set of results hold if an additional restriction is assumed: players must have
common punishments. Finally, to illustrate the role of our assumptions, we present
robust examples of games in which there is a subgame perfect equilibrium payoff
profile that cannot be obtained with 1 – memory. Thus, our results are the best
that can be hoped for.
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1 Introduction
The (subgame perfect) Folk Theorem of complete information repeated games states that any
individually rational payoffs can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) if the players
are sufficiently patient — see [13] and [3]. Such a multiplicity of equilibria arises because in repeated
games at any stage each player can condition his behavior on the past behavior of all the players.
Such long memories are clearly unreasonable.
Many papers have modeled memory in repeated games by considering strategies that recall only a
finite number past periods (see Section 2). Following this approach, in this paper, we restrict the
strategies to those that depend only on what has happened in the previous period. We refer to such
behavior by 1 – memory strategies. (In this paper, memory refers to the number of past periods the
players can recall; in the literature such memory limitations are also known as bounded recall.)
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As suggested by Aumann [2], it is reasonable to expect that the extensive multiplicity of equilibria
described by the Folk Theorem may be reduced by restricting players to limited memory strategies.
In contrast, we show that if the set of actions in the stage game is sufficiently “rich” (i.e., it has a
large number of actions), the Folk Theorem continues to hold with 1 – memory strategies.
Notice that except for stationary strategies (that take the same action following every history), 1
– memory strategies form, in terms of period recall, the simplest class of repeated game strategies.
Despite being simple and highly restrictive in their dependence on the past, they are, in games with
rich action spaces, able to generate a large set of equilibria. This is in sharp contrast to the case
of stationary strategies, which can only implement outcomes that consist of repetitions of Nash
equilibria of the stage game. Thus, it is surprising that, by increasing players’ memory from zero to
one period, the equilibrium set expands so significantly.
The richness of the set of actions assumption is critical in establishing the Folk Theorem (and
the other results in this paper) with one period memory. Before discussing the fundamental role
of this assumption, note that the Folk Theorem provides a characterization of the equilibrium set
when the players discount the future by arbitrarily small amounts. But even when players are
impatient, equilibrium strategies often require them to remember distant pasts. Therefore, we also
ask whether or not, for any arbitrary level of discounting, we can obtain all SPE payoffs with 1 –
memory strategies, if the action sets are sufficiently rich.
For an arbitrary level of discounting, Abreu [1] showed that any SPE payoff profile can be supported
by a simple strategy profile. We define a strictly enforceable SPE payoff profile as one that can be
sustained by a simple strategy profile with the property that the players strictly prefer to follow
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the associated simple strategy at every subgame. Then our main result here establishes that if the
action spaces are rich (formally, we assume that they are perfect sets 1 ) and the number of players
exceeds two, then any strictly enforceable SPE can be approximated by a 1 – memory SPE. We
also show that the same result holds with two players if, in addition, the equilibrium considered
is such that the two players have a common punishment path, i.e., the punishment path induced
when one player deviates is the same as that induced when the other player deviates.
The proof of our Folk Theorem with 1 – memory follows from the above results on the imple-
mentability of strictly enforceable SPEs. This is because when players are sufficiently patient, any
strictly individually rational payoff profile can be sustained by a strictly enforceable SPE, and in
the case of 2-players, with a common punishment path (see [13] and [14]). 2
Implementing equilibrium payoffs with 1 – memory is not easy and the richness of the action spaces
is critical to establishing our results. The first difficulty comes from implementing an outcome path
that involves playing the same action profile s a finite number of times T . Clearly, such a path
cannot be implemented with 1 – memory if T > 1. However, if the action space is rich, then players
can instead implement with 1 – memory a payoff profile close to the one of the original path by
playing T distinct action profiles s1, . . . , sT , each generating payoffs close to s.
1 A subset of a topological space X is a perfect set if X is equal to the set of all limit points of X, or
equivalently, X is a closed set with no isolated points. Therefore, perfect subsets of locally compact spaces
are uncountable.
2 In establishing our Folk theorem, we show that any strictly individually rational payoff profile can be
indeed induced exactly by a 1 – memory SPE (approximation is not necessary), when the players are
sufficiently patient.
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But to implement (even approximately) an equilibrium payoff vector with 1 – memory, we need a
great deal more than simply being able to implement a specific path. We basically require to know
the state of play by observing the outcome in the previous period. If the action spaces were not
rich then it would be difficult to know the state of play, and thus implement even approximately
a SPE with 1 – memory strategies. To illustrate this point, in Subsection 4, we provide a repeated
game example in which no efficient outcome can be (approximately) sustained by a 1 – memory
SPE, even when the players are almost fully patient. In this example, the difficulty arises because
each player has two pure actions and, as a result, it is difficult to identify, by recalling the previous
period outcome, if a player has singly deviated. Introducing rich action spaces by allowing mixed
strategies in this example, on the other hand, overcomes the problem because it allows one to
construct appropriate punishment paths such that the state of play is identifiable.
More generally, to sustain a simple strategy profile with 1 – memory, not only the equilibrium
paths and all the n punishment paths, where n denotes the number of the players, need to be
implementable with 1 – memory, but also it should be the case that (i) the action profiles used
in the punishment phase for any player occur neither on the equilibrium path nor be used in the
punishment phase for other players, and (ii) any single deviation can be detected by observing the
previous period. 3 Otherwise, it may not be possible for players to know the state of play with 1
– memory. To rule out such ambiguities, we consider simple strategies that are such that at any
stage players can, by observing only what has happened in the previous period, find out in which
phase of the n + 1 paths the play is in. We call such simple strategies confusion-proof and show
3 For instance, it must be the case that a player being punished cannot, by deviating from the action that
the punishments prescribe, give rise to an action profile on the equilibrium outcome.
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that simple strategies have 1 – memory if and only if they are confusion-proof.
The assumption of rich (perfect) action spaces ensures that there are uncountably many actions
close to each action of each player. Thus, any simple strategy profile can be perturbed so that each
player chooses different actions at different phases and periods, and as result, in the case of more
than two players, it is confusion-proof. This observation allows us to establish, for any arbitrary
discount factor, our main approximation result for the case with more than two players: any strictly
enforceable SPE can be perturbed to make it implementable with 1 – memory. The idea here is that
in any strictly enforceable simple strategy profile, players strictly prefer playing the simple strategies
at every subgame and hence there are slacks in the incentive conditions associated with such SPE;
these slacks, together with the richness assumption, then allow one to perturb the equilibrium to
make it confusion-proof, and hence 1 – memory, without destroying the players’ incentives.
It is very important to point out that, even with rich action spaces, the above perturbation argument
that replaces memory with a complex set of actions is not sufficient to implement all SPE with 1
– memory. First, if a SPE is not strictly enforceable, the incentive conditions are not all strict and
as a result it might not be possible to perturb the equilibrium to make it confusion-proof without
violating some incentive condition, i.e., without some slack in the incentive conditions, information
about the past cannot be coded into agents’ behavior. Second, with two players, in contrast to the
case with more than two, a simple SPE that involve choosing different actions at different phases
and periods is not necessarily confusion-proof. For instance, with two players, if at any period player
1 takes an action that belongs to the equilibrium path of a simple strategy profile and player 2 does
an action that belongs to a punishment path, then with 1 – memory it cannot be concluded whether
or not it was player 2 who deviated from the equilibrium path, or if it was player 1 who deviated
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from the punishment path. This is clearly a problem unless both players have a common punishment
path, in which case they do not need to know who has deviated.
These difficulties that arise when implementing equilibria with 1 – memory with impatient players
are illustrated in Section 7. (As our Folk Theorem demonstrates, these difficulties disappear if the
players are sufficiently patient). There, we provide some robust repeated game examples with rich
action spaces and discounting showing that some (efficient) SPE payoffs cannot be obtained with 1
– memory strategies. In both examples, the action space for each player at any stage consists of the
set of mixed strategies over two pure strategies and is therefore convex (and rich). In the first of the
two examples an efficient SPE cannot be approximately implemented with 1 – memory because the
game has two players. In the second example the problem is due to the lack of strict enforceability.
Moreover, these examples are generic since they remain valid for any small perturbations of the
payoffs and the discount factor. Thus, the two examples show that our main results are the best
that can be hoped for in terms of implementing 1 – memory SPEs with an arbitrary level of discount
factor.
In Section 7, we also briefly consider the question of 1 – memory implementation when an approx-
imate equilibrium concept is used. Here, we show that every SPE payoff profile, and not just those
that are strictly enforceable, can be approximately supported with a 1 – memory ε – equilibrium, for
all ε > 0 if either the number of players exceeds two or in the 2-player games a common punishment
can be used. 4
Despite the examples in Section 7, our results establish, at least for games with more than two
4 Here ε – equilibrium refers to contemporaneous perfect ε – equilibrium (see [22]).
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players, that if the action spaces are rich the restriction to 1 – memory strategies will not place
severe limitations on equilibrium payoffs. Rich action spaces endow agents with the capacity to
“code” information about who-deviated-when into their play; thereby, allowing us to establish our
results. However, we emphasize that this ability to encode histories into play is not the same as the
situation in which players have an arbitrary rich set of messages: Since in our framework the kind of
messages players can send are restricted to be their actions, it follows that they are costly to send.
Note, however, that the rich (perfect) action space assumption is consistent with most standard
games with infinite action spaces (e.g., Bertrand and Cournot competition) because it is often
assumed that the action space is a convex (and hence perfect) subset of some finite dimensional
Euclidean space. Also, since the set of mixed strategies are also convex, our richness assumption is
satisfied in any repeated game (with finite or infinite pure action space) in which at each stage the
players choose mixed strategies and past mixed actions are observable.
In Section 2, we discuss some related literature. In Section 3, we provide the notation and the
definitions. Section 4 presents an example illustrating the difficulties associated with non-rich ac-
tion spaces. In Section 5, we discuss when a simple strategy profile can be implemented with 1 –
memory, by characterizing the concept of confusion-proof simple strategies. By appealing to these
characterizations, we then present our main results in Section 6. In Section 7, we discuss whether
or not our main results on 1 – memory implementation for an arbitrary discount factor can be
weakened. All the proofs are in the Appendix and in the supplementary material to this paper.
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2 Related Literature on Bounded Memory
This paper deals with 1 – memory recall in repeated games with large action spaces. There is also
a significant literature on equilibria of repeated games with finite memory (in terms of recall). In
particular, Sabourian [26] obtained a perfect Folk Theorem with bounded memory strategies for the
case of repeated games with no discounting and finite number of pure actions. This paper concludes
that “in order to obtain a Folk Theorem like result with finite actions, one faces a trade-off between
the number of elements of the action space of the stage game and the length of the memory”. Barlo,
Carmona, and Sabourian [7] presents a perfect Folk Theorem for discounted 2-player repeated games
with bounded memory and finite action spaces, showing that, in order for the Folk Theorem to hold,
the lack of a rich action space can be compensated by expanding the size of players’ memory.
Bounded memory restriction has also been studied in the context of repeated games with imperfect
monitoring. Cole and Kocherlakota [11] consider the repeated prisoners’ dilemma with imperfect
public monitoring and finite memory. They show that for some set of parameters defection every
period is the only strongly symmetric public perfect equilibrium with bounded memory (regardless
of the discount factor), whereas the set strongly symmetric public perfect strategies with unbounded
recall is strictly larger. The particular example considered by Cole and Kocherlakota [11] does not
satisfy the identifiability condition used in Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin [12] to establish their
Folk Theorems for repeated games with imperfect monitoring. By strenghtening those identifiability
conditions and by allowing asymmetric strategies, Ho¨rner and Olszewski [15] obtained a perfect Folk
Theorem with bounded memory strategies for games with (public or private but almost public)
imperfect monitoring and finite action and outcome spaces. Their result, however, requires a rich
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set of public signal and displays a trade-off between the discount factor and the length of the memory.
However, all these papers are about large but finite memory. In contrast, our present paper shows
that when the action space is rich and monitoring is perfect, then 1 – memory strategies are enough
to establish the perfect Folk Theorem. 5
Memory in terms of recall used in this paper captures one aspect of complexity of a strategy. There
are clearly other aspects of complexity of a strategy which we do not address here. 6 In particular,
we obtain our approximation results with 1 – memory/recall by using paths that involve different
action profiles at each date. Such paths may be complex if we use an alternative definition of
complexity to the notion of memory we use in this paper. The objective here is not to tackle this
5 Other works on repeated games with bounded (recall) memory include Kalai and Stanford [17], Lehrer
[18], Aumann and Sorin [4], Lehrer [19], Neyman and Okada [23], Bhaskar and Vega-Redondo [9], Mailath
and Morris [20] and Mailath and Morris [21].
6 A particular important class of repeated strategies that has received considerable attention are those
represented by finite automata (see Kalai [16] for an early survey). Similar results to the ones obtained here
appeared in Kalai and Stanford [17] and Ben-Porath and Peleg [8]. The former shows that in repeated games
all SPE payoffs can be approximately supported by finite automata as an ε – equilibrium for sufficiently
large automata. The latter shows that if the players are sufficiently patient, the approximation with finite
automata can be done in terms of full SPE, as opposed to ε – equilibrium, and thereby establishes a Folk
Theorem with finite automata. Neither papers assume that the action spaces are rich, but they allow for
any finite size automata. Furthermore, in the case of Ben-Porath and Peleg [8], the bound on the size of
the automata depends on the level of approximation and hence is not uniform (with a different measure of
complexity a uniform bound on complexity may be sufficient; see Cho [10] for a neural network approach).
Our result are different because we only consider one period recall.
11
general issue of complexity but simply to characterize the implications of recall restriction, and
in particular, to explain how, with some qualifications, in repeated games with rich action spaces
players do not need to use much memory: remembering yesterday is almost enough to support all
SPE payoffs.
3 Notation and Definitions
The stage game:
A normal form game G is defined by G =
(
N, (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N
)
, where N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite
set of players, Si is the set of player i’s actions and ui :
∏
i∈N Si → R is player i’s payoff function.
We assume that Si is a perfect and compact metric space and that ui is continuous for all i ∈ N .
Note that if Si is convex, then Si is perfect. Therefore, the mixed extension of any finite normal
form game satisfies the above assumptions. 7
Let S =
∏
i∈N Si and S−i =
∏
j 6=i Si. Also, for any i ∈ N denote respectively the minmax payoff and
a minmax profile for player i by
vi = min
s−i∈S−i
max
si∈Si
ui(si, s−i), and mi ∈ arg min
s−i∈S−i
max
si∈Si
ui(si, s−i).
If G is a 2 – player game, a mutual minmax profile is m¯ = (m21,m
1
2).
Let D = co (u(S)), U = {y ∈ D : yi ≥ vi for all i ∈ N} and U0 = {y ∈ D : yi > vi for all i ∈ N}.
7 More generally, the mixed extension of any normal form game with compact metric strategy spaces and
continuous payoff functions also satisfies the above assumptions.
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The set U (resp. U0) is the set of (resp. strictly) individually rational payoffs.
The repeated game:
For all δ ∈ [0, 1), the supergame G∞(δ) of G consists of an infinite sequence of repetitions of G with
a common discount factor δ. We denote the action of any player i in G∞(δ) at any date t = 1, 2, 3, . . .
by sti ∈ Si. Also, let st = (st1, . . . , stn) be the profile of choices at t.
For t ≥ 1, a t – stage history is a sequence ht = (s1, . . . , st). The set of all t – stage histories is
denoted by Ht = S
t (the t – fold Cartesian product of S). We use H0 to represent the initial (0 –
stage) history. The set of all histories is defined by H =
⋃∞
t=0Ht.
For all i ∈ N , player i’s strategy is a function fi : H → Si. 8 The set of player i’s strategies is
denoted by Fi, and F =
∏
i∈N Fi is the joint strategy space with a typical element f ∈ F.
Given a strategy fi ∈ Fi and a history h ∈ H, denote the strategy induced at h by fi|h; thus
(fi|h)(h¯) = fi(h, h¯), for every h¯ ∈ H. Also, let f |h = (f1|h, . . . , fn|h) for every f ∈ F and h ∈ H.
Any strategy profile f ∈ F induces an outcome at any date as follows: pi1(f) = f(H0) and pit(f) =
f(pi1(f), . . . , pit−1(f)) for any t > 1. Denote the set of outcome paths by Π = S×S×· · · and define
the outcome path induced by any strategy profile f ∈ F by pi(f) = {pi1(f), pi2(f), . . .} ∈ Π.
We consider the following memory restriction on the set of strategies in this paper. For any history
h ∈ H \H0, the 1 – period tail of h is T (h) = st if h = (s1, . . . , st) for some t ≥ 1.
8 Notice that when G refers to the mixed extension of a normal form game, then the strategy in the
repeated game at any period may depend on past randomization choices which in such cases must be
publicly observable.
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Definition 1 A strategy fi ∈ Fi has one period memory (henceforth called 1 – memory) if fi(h) =
fi(h¯) for any two histories h, h¯ ∈ H \H0 such that T (h) = T (h¯).
Notice that in the above definition the choice of action at any date t depends only on the last stage
of the supergame and not t; thus, 1 – memory strategies are independent of the calendar time.
Since the players discount the future by a common discount factor δ < 1, the payoff in the supergame
G∞(δ) of G is then given by
Ui(f, δ) = (1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1ui(pit(f)).
Also, for any pi ∈ Π, t ∈ N, and i ∈ N , let V ti (pi, δ) = (1 − δ)
∑∞
r=t δ
r−tui(pir) be the continuation
payoff of player i at date t if the outcome path pi is played. For simplicity, when the meaning is
clear, we write Ui(f), V
t
i (pi) and Vi(pi) instead of Ui(f, δ), V
t
i (pi, δ) and V
1
i (pi, δ), respectively.
A strategy profile f ∈ F is a Nash equilibrium of G∞(δ) if Ui(f) ≥ Ui(fˆi, f−i) for all i ∈ N and all
fˆi ∈ Fi. A strategy profile f ∈ F is a SPE of G∞(δ) if f |h is a Nash equilibrium for all h ∈ H. An
outcome path pi is a subgame perfect outcome path if there exists a SPE f such that pi = pi(f).
We also define a 1 – memory SPE as a SPE with the additional property that it has 1 – memory. 9
9 Note that with this definition the equilibrium strategy of each player has 1 – memory but is best amongst
all strategies, including those with memory longer than one. Alternatively, we could have just required
optimality amongst the set of 1 – memory strategies. For the purpose of the results in this paper the two
possible definitions are equivalent.
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4 An Example with Non-Rich Action Spaces
In this section, we show, by means of an example, that when the action spaces are not rich, it is
possible that no efficient payoff vector can be supported by a 1 – memory SPE even if the discount
factor is near one.
Consider the following normal form game described by Table 1.
1\2 c d
c 4,4 0,10
d 10,0 1,1
Table 1
Payoff function for the example with non-rich action spaces
This game is a prisoners’ dilemma in which the outcome (c, c) is not efficient. In fact, the set of
efficient individually rational payoffs are those that are a convex combination of (10, 0) and (0, 10)
and give at least a payoff of 1 to each player. If there is no limit on the memory then any efficient
individually rational payoffs can be sustained by a SPE if δ is sufficiently large. In particular, the
path that alternates between playing (d, c) and (c, d), and thereby induces the payoff of 10
1+δ
for one
player and 10δ
1+δ
for the other player, can be sustained by a SPE if and only if δ ≥ 1/9. The necessity
part of this claim holds because if δ < 1/9 the payoff that one of the player obtains will be less than
the minmax payoff of 1. The sufficiency part holds because if δ ≥ 1/9 then the following grim type
strategy profile is a SPE: (i) on the equilibrium path play the path of alternating between (d, c)
and (c, d) and (ii) if in the past there has been a deviation from the equilibrium path then play
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the Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game, (d, d), forever. This strategy profile cannot, however,
be implemented with 1 – memory because then if (d, c) or (c, d) is observed it cannot be inferred
if in the previous period the game was following the equilibrium path or if the game was in the
punishment phase and one of the players had deviated from (d, d).
The problem of inferring the state of play with 1 – memory may not matter if appropriate incentives
were not needed to ensure that the players follow the equilibrium strategies. For example, when
δ = 1/9 the path consisting of playing (d, d) forever is no worse for a player than deviating from
(d, d) for one period followed by the (equilibrium) path of alternating between playing (d, c) and
(c, d) — both induce an average payoff of 1. Therefore, when δ = 1/9, the path that alternates
between playing (d, c) and (c, d) can be supported with a 1 – memory SPE f that is otherwise
identical to the grim profile except that if there is a single player deviation from (d, d) then the
game follows the equilibrium path of alternating between (d, c) and (c, d). 10 But such a profile is
not a SPE when δ > 1/9 because then it pays to deviate from the punishment path consisting of
(d, d) forever.
More generally, with 1 – memory, no efficient payoffs can be sustained by a SPE for any δ 6= 1/9.
To show this, suppose otherwise and assume that there is a 1 – memory SPE f such that U(f) is
efficient. Then, it must be that f(H0) is either (d, c) or (c, d). For concreteness, we consider the case
f(H0) = (d, c) (the case f(H0) = (c, d) is analogous).
Efficiency of U(f) also implies that f(d, c) is either (d, c) or (c, d). However, if f(d, c) = (d, c), then
(d, c) is played forever implying that U2(f) is not individually rational and f is not SPE. Thus,
10 Formally, f is such that f(H0) = (d, c), f(d, c) = (c, d), f(c, d) = (d, c) and f(c, c) = f(d, d) = (d, d).
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f(d, c) = (c, d). Similarly, it follows that f(c, d) = (d, c). Therefore, the equilibrium path must
consist of alternating between (d, c) and (c, d). Since such a path can be sustained as a SPE only if
δ ≥ 1/9 and, by assumption, δ 6= 1/9, it follows that δ must exceed 1/9.
The above shows that implementing efficient payoffs by 1 – memory SPE strategies imposes severe
restrictions on the equilibrium path. We now show that 1 – memory also restricts the off-the-
equilibium paths so that f cannot be SPE, and hence we obtain a contradiction to the supposition
that a 1 – memory efficient SPE exists.
First, note that f(d, d) 6= (d, d). This is because, otherwise player 1 can profitably deviate at the
history h = (d, d): instead of playing f1(d, d) = d, that would yield him a discounted payoff of
1, he can play c and then follow f1. By doing so, and despite losing a payoff of 1 in the current
period, he is able to bring the play back to the equilibrium path, obtaining a discounted payoff of
10δ/(1 + δ) > 1 = U1(f |h).
Second, it must be that f(d, d) = (c, c). To establish this, note first that if f(d, d) = (c, d), then
player 1 has a profitable deviation at the history h = (d, c): by playing according to f1 at h, he
receives 10δ/(10 + δ); by playing d at h and then following f1, he gets 1 − δ + 10δ/(1 + δ) >
10δ/(1 + δ) = U1(f |h). A symmetric argument shows that if f(d, d) = (c, d), then player 2 can
profitably deviate. Hence, it follows that f(d, d) = (c, c).
Third, it must be that f(c, c) 6= (c, c). The argument is similar to the one used to show that f(d, d) 6=
(d, d). As in there, if f(c, c) = (c, c), then player 1 can profitably deviate at h = (c, c) by playing d
and bringing the play back to the equilibrium path: his payoff would equal 10/(1+δ) > 4 = U1(f |h).
Fourth, we also cannot have that f(c, c) = (d, c) nor f(c, c) = (c, d). If f(c, c) = (d, c), then player 1
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can profitably deviate at h = (d, d): he receives 4(1−δ)+10δ/(1+δ) by playing according with f at
h, while, by playing d instead of c and then following f1, he gets 10/(1+ δ) > 4(1− δ)+10δ/(1+ δ).
Similarly, if f(c, c) = (c, d), then player 2 can deviate at h = (d, d).
Finally, there must be a profitable deviation by player 1 at h = (d, d), and hence f cannot be a
SPE. This is because, by the previous points, f(c, c) must equal (d, d), and thus f |h induces the
repetition of ((c, c), (d, d)) and an average payoff of (4 + δ)/(1 + δ) for each player; while, player 1
by playing d instead of c at h and then following f1 obtains 10/(1 + δ) > (4 + δ)/(1 + δ).
In the above example the lack of efficient 1 – memory SPEs arises because the action space for each
player consists of two elements. In order to illustrate this point, assume that players could choose a
third action, consisting of choosing c with probability 0.01 and d with probability 0.99. We assume
that the randomization devices are observable. Denoting this strategy by r, the resulting normal
form game can be described by Table 2.
1\2 c d r
c 4,4 0,10 4/100, 994/100
d 10,0 1,1 109/100,99/100
r 994/100,4/100 99/100,109/100 2159/2000,2159/2000
Table 2
Payoff function when players can randomize
In this case, we claim that the efficient outcome path pi = ((d, c), (c, d), . . .) can be supported by a 1
– memory strategy whenever δ > 1/4. In order to prove this claim, we shall define a strategy profile
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f as follows: f(H0) = (c, d) and, for all h ∈ H\H0, f(h) = g(T (h)) where g : {c, d, r}2 → {c, d, r}2
is given by
g(a, b) =

(b, a) if a, b ∈ {c, d} and a 6= b
(c, d) if (a, b) = (r, r)
(r, r) otherwise.
Thus, f is a 1 – memory and simple, and plays the path pi = ((d, c), (c, d), (d, c), (c, d), . . .) on the
equilibrium path and has a common punishment path ((r, r), pi). Furthermore, a single deviation
from pi or from (r, r) will be punished by playing (r, r) once, and then returning afterwards to pi.
To show that f is SPE, one only needs to establish the follows inequalities:
10δ
1 + δ
≥ 1− δ + δ(1− δ)2159
2000
+ δ2
10
1 + δ
(1− δ)2159
2000
+ δy≥ (1− δ)109
100
+ δ(1− δ)2159
2000
+ δ2y,
for all y ∈ {10/(1 + δ), 10δ/(1 + δ)}. Since δ > 1/4, it is easy to verify that the above inequalities
are indeed satisfied.
The above establishes that if the (random) action r, defined above, is available then the efficient
outcome path pi = ((d, c), (c, d), . . .) can be supported by a 1 – memory SPE whenever δ > 1/4. More
generally, if at each stage the players could choose any mixed action (randomize between c and d),
so that they had a rich action space, and their randomized strategies were to be publicly observable,
then the efficient outcome path pi = ((d, c), (c, d), . . .) can be supported by a 1 – memory strategy
profile whenever δ > 1/9. Furthermore, in this case, it can be shown (see Theorem 9 below) that
all individually rational payoffs (efficient or not) can be sustained by a 1 – memory SPE provided
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that δ is sufficiently close to one.
5 Confusion-Proof Paths and 1 – Memory
Abreu [1] used the concept of simple strategies to characterize the set of subgame perfect equilibria.
In this section, we consider simple strategy profiles that can be implemented with 1 – memory.
For this purpose, we introduce the notion of a confusion-proof profile of outcome paths and show
in Proposition 3 below that a profile of outcome paths can be supported by a 1 – memory simple
strategy profile if and only if it is confusion-proof. The concept of confusion-proof outcome paths is
our main tool and is used throughout the paper to establish our main results for 1 – memory SPEs.
Following Abreu [1], f ∈ F is a simple strategy profile represented by n+1 paths (pi(0), pi(1), . . . , pi(n))
if f specifies: (i) play pi(0) until some player deviates singly from pi(0); (ii) for any j ∈ N , play pi(j) if
the jth player deviates singly from pi(i), i = 0, 1, . . . , n, where pi(i) is the ongoing previously specified
path; (iii) if two or more players deviate simultaneously from pi(i), i = 0, 1, . . . , n, then play pi(j)
for some j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}; (iv) continue with the ongoing specified path pi(i), i = 0, 1, . . . , n, if no
deviations occur. These strategies are simple because the play of the game is always in only n + 1
states, namely, in state j ∈ {0, . . . , n} where pi(j),t is played, for some t ∈ N. In this case, we say
that the play is in phase t of state j. A profile (pi(0), pi(1), . . . , pi(n)) of n+1 outcome paths is subgame
perfect if the simple strategy profile represented by it is a SPE.
Henceforth, when the meaning is clear, we shall use the term (pi(0), pi(1), . . . , pi(n)) to refer to both
an n + 1 outcome paths as well as to the simple strategy profile represented by these paths. Also,
when referring to a profile of n+1 outcome paths, we shall not always explicitly mention n+1 and
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simply refer to it by a profile of outcome paths.
Now fix a simple strategy profile given by (pi(0), pi(1), . . . , pi(n)). The notion of a confusion-proof
profile of outcome paths (that is used to characterize 1 – memory simple strategies) is motivated by
the following observations. For the simple strategy profile to be supported by a 1 – memory simple
strategy profile, players need to infer the correct phase of the correct state of play by only observing
the action profile played in the previous period. This is not always possible because three kinds of
complications can arise if the strategies have 1 – memory.
The first kind of complication happens when pi(i),t = pi(j),r for some i, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} and t, r ∈ N.
That is, the action profile in phase t of state i is the same as that in phase r of state j. Since players
condition their behavior only on the last period’s action profile, the players cannot distinguish
between phase t of state i and phase r of state j, and therefore the simple strategy profile cannot
be implemented, unless pi(i),t+1 = pi(j),r+1.
The second kind of complication arises when pi
(i),t
k 6= pi(j),rk and pi(i),t−k = pi(j),r−k for some i, j ∈
{0, 1, . . . , n}, k ∈ N and t, r ∈ N; i.e., every player other than k ∈ N takes the same action in
phase t of state i and in phase r of state j. Then if, for example, the last period’s action profile is
pi(j),r, the players would not be able to deduce whether the play in the previous period was in phase
t of state i and player k deviated to pi
(j),r
k or whether it was in phase r of state j and no deviation has
occured. Since a deviation by player k from pi
(i),t
k to pi
(j),r
k in phase t of state i is impossible to detect
by observing only the action in the last period, the simple strategy profile cannot be implemented,
unless pi(i),t+1 = pi(j),r+1 = pi(k),1.
The third kind of complication appears when pi
(i),t
l 6= pi(j),rl , pi(i),tm 6= pi(j),rm and pi(i),t−l,m = pi(j),r−l,m for some
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i, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, l,m ∈ N and t, r ∈ N. In words, all players other than l and m ∈ N take the
same action both in phase t of state i, and in phase r of state j. Then, if the last period’s action
profile is given by (pi
(i),t
l , pi
(j),r
m , (pi
(i),t
k )k 6=l,m) = (pi
(i),t
l , pi
(j),r
m , (pi
(j),r
k )k 6=l,m), players, looking back one
period, can conclude that either player l or player m has deviated. But, they cannot be certain of
the identity of the deviator. Consequently, both of them must be punished. This requires pi(l) = pi(m).
These observations are formalized below as follows. For any profile of outcome paths (pi(0), pi(1), . . . ,
pi(n)) ⊆ Πn+1, let
Ω ({i, t}, {j, r}) = {k ∈ N : pi(i),tk 6= pi(j),rk }
be the set of players whose actions in phase t of stage i and in phase r stage j are different.
Definition 2 A profile (pi(0), . . . , pi(n)) ∈ Πn+1 of outcome paths is confusion-proof if for any i, j ∈
{0, 1, . . . , n} and t, r ∈ N the following holds:
(1) If Ω({i, t}, {j, r}) = ∅, then pi(i),t+1 = pi(j),r+1.
(2) If Ω({i, t}, {j, r}) = {k} for some k ∈ N , then pi(i),t+1 = pi(j),r+1 = pi(k),1.
(3) If Ω({i, t}, {j, r}) = {k, l} for some k and l ∈ N , then pi(k) = pi(l).
The above observations, which motivated the definition of confusion-proof outcome paths, suggest
that confusion-proofness is necessary to support a profile of outcome paths with an 1 – memory
simple strategy profile. The next Proposition asserts that confusion-proofness is, in fact, not only a
necessary but also a sufficient condition to support a profile of outcome paths with 1 – memory.
Proposition 3 A profile of outcome paths is confusion-proof if and only if there exists a 1 – memory
simple strategy profile represented by it.
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The 1 – memory strategy profile f supporting the confusion-proof profile of outcome paths given by
(pi(0), pi(1), . . . , pi(n)) ⊆ Πn+1 is as follows: If the last period of a given history equals pi(j),t, for some
j = 0, 1, . . . , n and t ∈ N, then player i chooses pi(j),t+1i . If only player k ∈ N deviated from the
outcome pi(j) in the last period of the history, then player i chooses pi
(k),1
i . Finally, if more then one
player deviated from the outcome pi(j) in the last period of the history, then player i chooses pi
(m),k
i
for some m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} and k ∈ N. Since f has 1 – memory and has the structure of a simple
strategy profile, we say that f is a 1 – memory simple strategy. As before, the profile (pi(0), . . . , pi(n))
represents f . The main task of the sufficiency part of the proof of Proposition 3 is to show that f
is well defined, which we show follows from (pi(0), . . . , pi(n)) being confusion-proof.
Before turning to the equilibrium characterization with 1 – memory, we shall next provide a set of
easily tractable sufficient conditions for a profile of outcome paths to be confusion-proof. These are
different for the case of 2 – player games from that with three or more players because, as in the
implementation literature, when there are only two players, it may not be possible to detect which
of the two players have deviated and as a result both must be punished with the same punishment
path whenever a deviation is detected.
Lemma 4 A profile of outcome paths (pi(0), pi(1), . . . , pi(n)) is confusion-proof if one of the following
conditions holds:
(1) The number of players exceeds two and for all i, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} and t, r ∈ N satisfying
(i, t) 6= (j, r) the number of players whose actions in phase t of stage i and in phase r stage j
are different is at least three: |Ω({i, t}, {j, r})| ≥ 3.
(2) The number of players equals two and the following two conditions hold:
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(a) players have the same punishment path: pi(1) = pi(2);
(b) for all i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2} and t, r ∈ N satisfying (i, t) 6= (j, r) and {i, j} 6= {1, 2} the actions
of each agent is distinct: pi
(i),t
l 6= pi(j),rl for any l = 1, 2.
The sufficient conditions specified in Lemma 4 are not necessary for confusion-proofness. However,
it is worth pointing out that when n = 2 the common punishment condition specified in 2a is
almost necessary: confusion-proof in this case implies that the punishment paths for the two players
are identical beyond the first period of punishments (See [6] and the supplementary material for
details).
6 Main Results
6.1 1 – Memory SPE with an Arbitrary Discount Factor
To establish our results for SPE payoffs which can be implemented with 1 – memory, we start with
Abreu’s [1] characterization of SPE outcome paths in terms of simple strategies. 11 A profile of
outcome paths (pˆi(0), . . . , pˆi(n)) ∈ Πn+1 is weakly enforceable if
V ti (pˆi
(j)) ≥ (1− δ) sup
si 6=pˆi(j),ti
ui(si, pˆi
(j),t
−i ) + δVi(pˆi
(i)) (1)
for all i ∈ N , j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} and t ∈ N. Abreu [1] showed that subgame perfection is equivalent
to weak enforceability. More precisely, an outcome path pˆi(0) is a SPE outcome path if and only if
there exists a weakly enforceable profile of outcome paths (pˆi(0), . . . , pˆi(n)).
11One can ask whether all 1 – memory SPE payoffs can be obtained using 1 – memory simple strategies.
Although interesting, we do not address this question.
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It then follows from Proposition 3 that any weakly enforceable, confusion-proof profile of outcome
paths can be supported by a 1 – memory simple SPE strategy profile. Thus, in terms of payoffs, we
have the following corollary to Proposition 3.
Corollary 5 Let u be SPE payoff vector that can be supported by a weakly enforceable, confusion-
proof profile of outcome paths. Then, there is a 1 – memory SPE strategy profile f such that U(f) =
u. 12
In general, for an arbitrarily discount factor, we cannot support all subgame perfect payoff vectors
by 1 – memory strategies. In fact, the best that can be hoped for is to obtain them approximately.
Our approach will thus be to approximate any SPE with an arbitrarily close 1 – memory strategy
profile. The difficulty is to ensure that the latter is also a SPE. This can be achieved if the original
equilibrium is robust to perturbations.
More formally, since any SPE has to be weakly enforceable, it turns out that a slack in the incentive
conditions (1) is needed in order to perform the required approximations. This leads us to introduce
the notion of strictly enforceable SPE.
Definition 6 A simple strategy profile defined by n + 1 outcome paths (pˆi(0), . . . , pˆi(n)) is a strictly
enforceable SPE if
inf
t∈N
V ti (pˆi(j))−
(1− δ) sup
si 6=pˆi(j),ti
ui(si, pˆi
(j),t
−i ) + δVi(pˆi
(i))
 > 0 (2)
for all i ∈ N and all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}. Furthermore, a payoff vector u ∈ Rn is a strictly enforceable
12Note that the rich action spaces assumption (Si is perfect for all i ∈ N) is not needed to establish this
corollary.
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SPE payoff profile if there exists a strictly enforceable SPE strategy profile f such that u = U(f).
The next theorem demonstrates that under certain conditions, any strictly enforceable SPE payoff
can be approximated by a 1 – memory strictly enforceable SPE payoff profile.
Theorem 7 Let u be a strictly enforceable SPE payoff vector induced by the simple strategy profile
(pˆi(0), . . . , pˆi(n)). Then, for any approximation level η > 0, there is a 1 – memory strictly enforceable
SPE payoff profile u′ such that ‖u′ − u‖ < η, provided that either n ≥ 3, or n = 2 and pˆi(1) = pˆi(2).
The proof of Theorem 7 uses the perfectness of Sk and the continuity of uk for all k ∈ N to construct
a confusion-proof profile of outcome paths (p¯i(0), . . . , p¯i(n)) that is arbitrarily close to (pˆi(0), . . . , pˆi(n))
in terms of the distance in payoffs. In fact, since Sk is perfect, there are uncountably many actions
close to pˆi
(i),t
k , for all k ∈ N , i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} and t ∈ N. Hence, fixing any i and t, it is possible
to choose an action profile p¯i(i),t arbitrarily close to pˆi(i),t such that, for all k ∈ N , p¯i(i),tk 6= p¯i(j),rk for
all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} and r ∈ N such that either r < t or r = t and j < i. But this means that
when n > 2, by induction, we can construct a profile of outcome paths (p¯i(0), . . . , p¯i(n)) satisfying
(α) p¯i
(i),t
k 6= p¯i(j),rk holds for all k ∈ N , i, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} and t, r ∈ N such that (i, t) 6= (j, r) and
(β) uk(p¯i
(i),t) is close to uk(pˆi
(i),t) for all k ∈ N , i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} and t ∈ N. Property (α) together
with Lemma 4 then imply that (p¯i(0), . . . , p¯i(n)) is confusion-proof when n ≥ 3 and property (β)
implies that it is also a strictly enforceable SPE. Furthermore, when n = 2, the assumption that
pˆi(1) = pˆi(2) implies that (p¯i(0), p¯i(1), p¯i(2)) can be chosen so that p¯i(1) = p¯i(2) and still satisfies properties
(α) (modified by replacing i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2} by i, j ∈ {0, 1}) and (β).
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6.2 Folk Theorem with 1 – Memory
In Theorem 7, the approximate implementation with 1 – memory is obtained for the set of SPE
payoffs that are strictly enforceable and, for the case with two players, have common punishment
paths. For an arbitrary discount factor, these restrictions to strictly enforceable SPE payoffs and
common punishment paths when n = 2, cannot be weakened as the examples in the next section
demonstrate. On the other hand, it turns out that in the limit, as the discount factor tends to
1, these constraints on the set of SPEs restrict nothing and, furthermore, there is no need for
approximating the set of SPE payoffs. Thus, the Folk Theorem remains valid with 1 – memory.
Indeed, when the stage game is full-dimensional (dim(U) = n), an approximate Folk Theorem with
1 – memory follows immediately from Theorem 7 and Proposition 1 in Fudenberg and Maskin [14]
and its proof. First, by the latter, if dim(U) = n, every strictly individually rational payoff profile
can be supported by a strictly enforceable SPE strategy profile whenever the discount factor is
sufficiently close to one. Second, by the former, every strictly enforceable SPE can be approximately
implemented by a 1 – memory SPE if n > 2. Therefore, we have the following approximate Folk
Theorem as a corollary to Theorem 7.
Corollary 8 Suppose that n > 2 and dim(U) = n. Then, for every individually rational payoff
u ∈ U and any level of approximation η > 0, there exists δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all δ ≥ δ∗, there
is a 1 – memory SPE f ∈ F with ‖U(f, δ)− u‖ < η.
When n = 2, the same approximate Folk Theorem with 1 – memory also holds (in this case the full-
dimensionality assumption is not needed). But to demonstrate this there is an additional difficulty
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because, with two players, Theorem 7 requires a common punishment path. Therefore, to overcome
the difficulty one needs to extend the results in Fudenberg and Maskin [14] to show that, with
n = 2, every strictly individually rational payoff can be supported by a strictly enforceable SPE
simple strategy profile with a common punishment, whenever the discount factor is sufficiently close
to one. This can be done using the punishment used in Fudenberg and Maskin’s [13] Folk Theorem
with two players that consists of playing the mutual minmax action profile for a finite number of
periods (see the proof of Theorem 9 below).
The approximate Folk Theorem described in Corollary 8 (and its extension to 2-player games) can
in fact be made stronger by showing that any payoff profile belonging to the relative interior of
the set of individually rational payoff profiles U can be sustained exactly by a 1 – memory SPE.
Formally, let ri(U) be the relative interior of the set U with respect to the topology induced by
the affine hull of U (if dim(U) = n, then ri(U) equals the interior of U); then we can establish the
following exact Folk Theorem with 1 – memory.
Theorem 9 Suppose that either dim(U) = n or n = 2 and U0 6= ∅. Then, for all u ∈ ri(U), there
exists δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all δ ≥ δ∗, there is a 1 – memory SPE f ∈ F with U(f, δ) = u. 13
There are two parts to the proof of Theorem 9. First, we find conditions that ensure that a strictly
enforceable SPE payoff profile can be implemented exactly with 1 – memory. Second, by extending
Proposition 1 in Fudenberg and Maskin [14], we show that any u ∈ ri(U) is strictly enforceable and
13As in the full memory case, it can be shown that our 1 – memory Folk Theorem can be extended to the
case when the players do not discount the future, without assuming the full-dimensionality condition (see
the supplementary material of this paper for the details).
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satisfies these conditions, if the players are sufficiently patient.
Turning to the first part of the proof, recall that by Theorem 7 any strictly enforceable payoff
u, induced by a simple strategy profile (pˆi(0), . . . , pˆi(n)), can approximately implemented by a 1 –
memory SPE if either n ≥ 3, or n = 2 and pi(1) = pi(2). To implement any such u exactly by a 1 –
memory SPE, it is sufficient to assume that, in addition, the equilibrium path pˆi(0) is implementable
with 1 – memory (i.e., pˆi(0) does not involve any confusing instances). Formally, a single outcome
path pi is confusion-proof (and so can be implemented with 1 – memory) if for any two periods
t, r ∈ N the following two conditions (similar to those made in Definition 2) hold:
If pit = pir, then pit+1 = pir+1.
If pit 6= pir, then
∣∣∣{k ∈ N : pitk 6= pirk}∣∣∣ ≥ min{n, 3}.
Also, let Πcp to be the set of all single confusion-proof paths. Then, we have the following exact 1
– memory implementation analogue of Theorem 7. 14
Lemma 10 Suppose that the payoff vector u can be induced by a strictly enforceable simple strategy
profile (pˆi(0), . . . , pˆi(n)) and pˆi(0) ∈ Πcp. Then, there is a 1 – memory SPE strategy profile f ∈ F such
that U(f) = u, provided that either n ≥ 3, or n = 2 and pˆi(1) = pˆi(2).
The above lemma can be established as follows. Since (pˆi(0), pˆi(1), . . . , pˆi(n)) is strictly enforceable, the
14 In this paper, we have assumed that 1 – memory strategy cannot depend on the calendar time. When
actions can be conditioned on the calender time, then all outcome paths, and not just all the single
confusion-proof ones, can be implemented with 1 – memory strategies. This allows one to show that, with
time-dependence, any strictly enforceable SPE can be implemented exactly as a 1 – memory SPE (see the
supplementary material for the details).
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profile (pˆi(0), p¯i(1), . . . , p¯i(n)) is also a strictly enforceable SPE for any punishment profile (p¯i(1), . . . , p¯i(n))
that is sufficiently close to the punishment profile (pˆi(1), . . . , pˆi(n)); furthermore, since Si is perfect
and ui is continuous for all i ∈ N , it follows, as in the proof of Theorem 7, that (p¯i(1), . . . , p¯i(n))
can be appropriately chosen so that (pˆi(0), p¯i(1), . . . , p¯i(n)) is confusion-proof and hence 1 – memory
implementable. 15
To complete the proof of Theorem 9, it then follows from Lemma 10 that it is sufficient to show that,
when δ is close to 1, every u ∈ ri(U) can be exactly induced by a strictly enforceable path profile
(pˆi(0), . . . , pˆi(n)) such that pˆi(0) ∈ Πcp and pˆi(1) = pˆi(2) when n = 2. Thus, we need to extend Proposition
1 in Fudenberg and Maskin [14] (and its extension to n = 2) to ensure that the equilibrium path
pˆi(0) corresponding to any such u belongs to the set Πcp and, as in [14], is such that, for every player,
his continuation payoff at any date is bounded away from his minmax payoff. This we establish
with the help of the following Lemma. 16
Lemma 11 Suppose that either dim(U) = n or n = 2 and U0 6= ∅. Then, for all u ∈ ri(U), there
exist δ′ ∈ (0, 1) and ζ > 0 with the following property: for all δ ≥ δ′ there exists pi ∈ Πcp such that
u = V (pi, δ) and V ti (pi, δ) > vi + ζ for all i ∈ N .
15 To save space, we shall omit the details of the proof of this lemma.
16We are thankful to an anonymous referee for suggesting to us this lemma and the statement of Theorem
9.
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7 Counter-Examples and Approximate Equilibrium
Theorem 9 above demonstrates that 1 – memory does not restrict the set of SPE payoffs when
the discount factor is allowed to be arbitrarily close to 1. On the other hand, when the players
are impatient, in Theorem 7 we could only show that every SPE payoff profile is approximately
implementable with 1 – memory if (i) it is strictly enforceable and (ii) either the number of players
exceeds two or punishment paths were common. Below, using two examples, we show that both
of these conditions are essential in the analysis with arbitrary discount factors, and the lack of
either could result in 1 – memory SPE being a strict subset of SPE. The first example considers
a 2-player game in which an efficient payoff profile can be supported (even approximately) as a
strictly enforceable SPE only if the players punishment paths are different. Imposing 1 – memory,
however, restricts the punishment paths that can be implemented and, as a result, rules out such
an efficient payoff profile as a SPE. The second example deals with a 3-player game in which the
lack of strict enforceability delivers the same conclusion.
Finally, we end this section by briefly considering the notion of 1 – memory ε – equilibrium im-
plementation, for any small ε > 0. As we mentioned before in footnote 6, Kalai and Stanford [17]
showed that, for any arbitrary discount factor, every SPE payoff profile can be implemented by
a finite complexity ε – equilibrium. We show that the same conclusion holds for 1 – memory im-
plementation if either the number of players exceeds two or the SPE has a common punishment
path. Thus, even though the assumption of a common punishment for 2-players games cannot be
weakened, the strict enforceability assumption is not needed to implement the set of SPEs with 1
– memory as ε – equilibria.
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7.1 A Two Player Example
Consider the following normal form game described by Table 3. Assume that players can randomize.
Let Si = [0, 1] for all i = 1, 2, where si ∈ Si is to be interpreted as the probability assigned by
player i to action a. Note that the minmax payoff is 2 for each player. In the case of player 1, it can
only be obtained by m1 = (a, b), while m2 = (b, a) is the only action profile leading to the minmax
payoff for player 2. Moreover, both m1 and m2 are Nash equilibria of the stage game.
1\2 a b
a 4,4 2,5
b 5,2 0,0
Table 3
Payoff function for the 2-player example with rich action spaces
Now suppose that the above game is played infinitely often and each player’s randomization device
is observable to the other. If there are no bounds on the memory and δ ≥ 1/3, then the payoff vector
(4, 4) can be sustained as a SPE by a simple strategy profile that plays (a, a) at each date on the
equilibrium path and punishes deviations from player i = 1, 2 by playing mi forever. Furthermore,
this simple strategy profile is strictly enforceable if δ > 1/3.
Since the punishment paths for the two players in the above simple profile are different, this profile
cannot be implemented with 1 – memory because it may not be possible to know who has deviated
and therefore whom to punish (for example, with 1 – memory, if m2 = (b, a) is observed it cannot
be inferred if in the previous period player 1 has deviated from (a, a) or if player 2 was being
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punished). The impact of the 1 – memory restriction is, in fact, more profound than not being able
to implement the above strategy profile. Below we show that that there exists δ′ > 1/3 such that,
for all δ ∈ [1/3, δ′), the SPE payoff of (4, 4) cannot be even approximately implemented by any 1 –
memory SPE strategies. 17
To show this, fix any δ ≥ 1/3, any η > 0 and consider any 1 – memory SPE f such that
‖U(f)− (4, 4)‖ < η. For each player i = 1, 2, denote the equilibrium action taken by player i
at date 1 by pi = fi(H0) and let gi : [0, 1]
2 → [0, 1] be such that fi(h) = gi(T (h)) for all h ∈ H \H0.
Then the following claims hold for any such strategy profile f .
Claim 1: pi ≥ 1− 2η7(1−δ) for each i.
Let V t = V t1 (pi(f)) + V
t
2 (pi(f)) for ant t ∈ N. Clearly, V t ≤ 8. Moreover,
V 1 = (1− δ)(8p1p2 + 7p1(1− p2) + 7p2(1− p1)) + δV 2 ≤ (1− δ)(7p1 + 7p2 − 6p1p2) + 8δ. (3)
Since ‖U(f)− (4, 4)‖ < η, it follows that 8−2η < V 1. But then, by (3), 8−2η < (1−δ)(pi+7)+8δ
for each i = 1, 2. Therefore, pi ≥ 1− 2η7(1−δ) .
Claim 2: For any q ∈ S2, g1(p1, q) < α1 + β1q where α1 = 4+η−2δ−5(1−δ)p12δ(1−δ) and β1 = 3p1−22δ .
Consider a deviation by player 2 to a strategy f¯2 defined by f¯2(H0) = q and f¯2(h) = 1 for all
h ∈ H \H0. Then, since player 2 can guarantee himself a payoff of 2 in every period, this deviation
would him a payoff of
U2(f1, f¯2) ≥ (1− δ)[4p1q+5p1(1− q)+2(1− p1)q]+ (1− δ)δ[4g1(p1, q)+2(1− g1(p1, q))]+2δ2. (4)
17 In the supplementary material to this paper, we also prove that this conclusion is robust to any small
perturbations in the stage game payoffs.
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Then since f is a SPE, the claim follows from (4) and 4 + η > U2(f) ≥ U2(f1, f¯2).
Claim 3: For any q ∈ S1, g2(q, p2) < α1 + β1q where α2 = 4+η−2δ−5(1−δ)p22δ(1−δ) and β2 = 3p2−22δ .
This follows by an analogous reasoning as in Claim 2.
Claim 4: For all q ∈ S2, g2(p1, q) ≥ α3 − β3g1(p1, q) where α3 = 2−5δ3(1−δ) and β3 = 23 .
To see this, consider for player 1 the strategy f¯1 of playing a at every history: f¯1(h) = 1 for all
h ∈ H. Note that for all q ∈ S2
U1(f¯1, f2|(p1, q)) ≥ (1− δ)[4g2(p1, q) + 2(1− g2(p1, q))] + 2δ = 2 + (1− δ)2g2(p1, q). (5)
We also have that
U1(f |(p1, q)) ≤
(1− δ) [4g1(p1, q)g2(p1, q) + 2g1(p1, q)(1− g2(p1, q)) + 5(1− g1(p1, q))g2(p1, q)] + 5δ =
(1− δ)[2g1(p1, q) + 5g2(p1, q)− 3g1(p1, q)g2(p1, q)] + 5δ ≤ (1− δ)[2g1(p1, q) + 5g2(p1, q)] + 5δ.
(6)
Again, since f is SPE, we have U1(f |(1, q)) ≥ U1(f¯1, f2|(1, q)). This, together with (5) and (6),
implies the claim.
Next, consider player 1 deviating from the equilibrium path by choosing strategy f˜1 defined by
f˜1(H0) = 0, f˜1(0, p2) = p1 and f˜1(h) = 1 for all h ∈ H \ {H0, (0, p2)}. Then,
U1(f˜1, f2)≥ 5p2(1− δ) + δ(1− δ)u1(p1, g2(0, p2)) + δ2(1− δ)u1(1, g2(p1, g2(0, p2))) + 2δ3 (7)
≥ 5p2(1− δ) + 2δ(1− δ)p1 + δ2(1− δ)2g2(p1, g2(0, p2)) + 2δ3.
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Now note that, by Claim 3, we have
g2(0, p2) ≤ 4 + η − 2δ − 5(1− δ)p2
2δ(1− δ) . (8)
This, together with Claim 2, implies that
g1(p1, g2(0, p2)) ≤ 4 + η − 2δ − 5(1− δ)p1
2δ(1− δ) +
(3p1 − 2)
2δ
g2(0, p2). (9)
But then, by Claim 4, we have a lower bound to g2(p1, g2(0, 1)) given by:
g¯2(p1, g2(0, 1)) =
2− 5δ
3(1− δ) −
2
3
g1(p1, g2(0, p2)). (10)
But as δ → 1/3 and η → 0, we have by Claim 1, (8), (9) and (10) respectively that pi → 1 for each
i, g2(0, p2) → 0, g1(p1, g2(0, p2)) → 0 and g¯2(p1, g2(0, 1)) → 1/6. Hence, as δ → 1/3 and η → 0, by
(7), any limit point of U1(f˜1, f2) is no less than 4+
2
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. Since by assumption U1(f)→ 4 as δ → 1/3,
then U1(f˜1, f2) > U1(f) for all δ and η sufficiently close to 1/3 and 0, respectively, yielding the
desired contradiction.
The basic idea in the above proofs is that players cannot be as severely punished in the 1 – memory
case as in the full memory case. This can be illustrated by considering the values of g2(0, p2) and
g2(p1, g2(0, 1)) for δ and η sufficiently close to 1/3 and 0, respectively. In the full memory case,
a deviation by player 1 from a can lead player 2 to choose b forever, while in the 1 – memory
case, although it leads player 2 to choose b almost for sure in the first period after the deviation
(g2(0, p2) is close to 0), in the second period after the deviation player 2 would have to play a with a
probability bounded away from zero (g2(p1, g2(0, 1)) is close to 1/6). Consequently, the punishment
with 1 – memory is less severe and for such values of δ and η, a profitable deviation for player 1
exists.
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7.2 A Three Player Example with Lack of Strict Enforceability
Let G be the mixed extension of the following normal form game with three players: all players
have pure action spaces given by Ai = {a, b},
u3(a1, a2, a3) =

4 if a3 = a and
2 if a3 = b.
for all a1 ∈ A1 and a2 ∈ A2, u1 and u2 are defined by Table 3 above if a3 = a and arbitrarily if
a3 = b.
Clearly, u3(a1, a2, a) > u3(a
′
1, a
′
2, b) for all a1, a
′
1 ∈ A1 and a2, a′2 ∈ A2. Therefore, if f is a SPE, then
f3(h) = a for all h ∈ H. Thus, we are effectively in the same situation as in the 2-player example in
the previous subsection. Therefore, the payoff vector (4, 4, 4) is a SPE if there are no bounds on the
memory and δ ≥ 1/3. However, arguing as in the 2-player example, one can show that there exists
a discount factor δ′ > 1/3 such that such that the SPE payoff of (4, 4, 4) cannot be supported by a
1 – memory SPE for any δ ∈ [1/3, δ′). 18
7.3 Implementation in Approximate Equilibrium
The concept of approximate equilibrium we employ is the notion of contemporaneous perfect ε –
equilibrium (ε –CPE) that is formally defined as follows (see Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson
18Note that, by the same arguments as in the supplementary material, this conclusion is robust to any
small perturbations in the stage game payoffs.
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[22]): For all ε ≥ 0, a strategy profile f ∈ F is a contemporaneous ε – Nash equilibrium of the
supergame of G if for all i ∈ N , V ti (pi(f)) ≥ V ti (pi(fˆi, f−i)) − ε for all t ∈ N and fˆi ∈ Fi. A
strategy profile f ∈ F is a contemporaneous perfect ε – equilibrium of the supergame of G if f |h
is a contemporaneous ε – Nash equilibrium for every h ∈ H. Using an argument analogous to
that of Theorem 7, we can infer analogous conclusion as that in Kalai and Stanford [17] with
1 – memory strategies. This is because (i) any SPE payoff profile can supported by a weakly
enforceable simple strategy (pˆi(0), pˆi(1), . . . , pˆi(n)), and (ii) for any ε > 0, we can construct a confusion-
proof profile of outcome paths (p¯i(0), . . . , p¯i(n)) that is sufficiently close to (pˆi(0), . . . , pˆi(n)) so that
it is an ε – CPE (simply ensure that |uk(p¯i(i),t) − uk(pˆi(i),t)| < ε/2 and |maxsk∈Sk uk(sk, p¯i(i),t−k ) −
maxsk∈Sk uk(sk, pˆi
(i),t
−k )| < ε/2 for all k ∈ N , i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} and t ∈ N). Using these two simple
observations, we can state an analogous result to Theorem 4.1 of [17] as follows.
Corollary 12 For every SPE payoff vector u ∈ Rn, every η > 0 and every ε > 0, there is a 1 –
memory ε – CPE, f ∈ F , such that ‖U(f)− u‖ < η, whenever either n ≥ 3, or n = 2 and there
exist a SPE simple strategy profile described by (pˆi(0), pˆi(1), pˆi(2)) such that pˆi(1) = pˆi(2) and V (pˆi(0)) = u.
Note that in Corollary 12, it is assumed that the punishment paths are common when n = 2. This
assumption again cannot be weakened even for the case of ε – CPE. In fact, we can extend the
analysis of the 2 – player example of Subsection 7.1 to show that the SPE payoff vector (4, 4) cannot
even be approximated by a 1 – memory ε – CPE, for small ε > 0 for δ near 1/3. 19 And again the
reason for this is that to enforce the payoff vector (4, 4) (or a payoff close to it) as a ε – CPE requires
different punishment paths, which are not feasible with 1 – memory.
19We demonstrate this in the supplementary material to this paper.
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On the other hand, it follows from Corollary 12 that for δ ≥ 1/3, the SPE payoff vector (4, 4, 4) in
the 3 – player example of Subsection 7.2 can be approximated arbitrarily closely with a 1 – memory
ε – CPE, for all ε > 0. 20 Since this payoff vector cannot be approximately supported by any 1 –
memory SPE for δ near 1/3, it follows that there is a discontinuity in the sense that (4, 4, 4) can
be obtained with a 1 – memory ε – CPE for all ε > 0, whereas it cannot when ε = 0 (the same
discontinuity holds if we perturb the stage game payoffs). To see the nature of this discontinuity,
note that the payoff profile (4, 4, 4) cannot be obtained with a strictly enforceable simple strategy
profile because player 3 has a dominant strategy that induces a payoff of 4 at every stage game
(therefore, the continuation payoff of player 3 is the same at every history). 21 This implies that
the hypothesis of Theorem 7 on strict enforceability does not hold for (4, 4, 4) when ε = 0. On the
other hand, when ε exceeds zero the payoffs at different histories do not have to be the same, and
as a result, (4, 4, 4) can be obtained as an ε – CPE.
8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have tried to characterize the set of subgame perfect equilibrium strategies with 1
– memory recall when the stage game action spaces are sufficiently rich. The availability of a large
number of actions may suggest that the restriction to 1 – period memory is of little consequence,
as action sets are so rich that they allow players to encode all past information at almost no cost.
In this paper, we tried to see what is required to formalize this intuition. This has turned out to be
20 Indeed, since this payoff can be supported by a confusion-proof single path (repeating (a, a, a) forever),
it can be obtained exactly as an ε – CPE with 1 – memory.
21Notice that, in the 2 player example, there is no discontinuity of the ε – CPE correspondence at ε = 0.
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rather intricate. Our characterization of 1 – memory SPE for arbitrary discount factors then involved
first characterizing simple equilibrium paths that can be implemented with 1 – memory strategies
(confusion-proof simple paths) and second, finding appropriate slackness in the incentive constraints
to ensure that an equilibrium can be perturbed to make it 1 – memory implementable. To illustrate
the intricacies of the issues, we also provide robust examples of SPE payoffs with patient players
that cannot be sustained even approximately with 1 – memory strategies. Our characterization
results enable us to show that 1 – memory strategies are enough to obtain all SPE payoffs if the
players are sufficiently patient.
A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.
(Sufficiency) Let (pi(0), . . . , pi(n)) be a confusion-proof profile of outcome paths. Let i ∈ N and define
fi as follows: fi(H0) = pi
(0),1
i and for any h ∈ H \H0, j ∈ {0, . . . , n}, l ∈ N and t ∈ N
fi(h) =

pi
(j),t+1
i if T (h) = pi
(j),t,
pi
(l),1
i if T (h) = (sl, pi
(j),t
−l ) and sl 6= pi(j),tl ,
pi
(0),1
i otherwise.
Now we show that f is a well defined function. First, suppose that pi(j),t = pi(k),r for some k, j ∈
{0, 1, . . . , n} and r, t ∈ N. Then, f is well defined if pi(k),r+1 = pi(j),t+1. Since (pi(0), . . . , pi(n)) is
confusion-proof, it follows from part 1 of Definition 2 that this is indeed the case.
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Second, suppose that pi(k),r = (sl, pi
(j),t
−l ) and sl 6= pi(j),tl for k, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, l ∈ N and r, t ∈
N. Then, f is well defined only if pi(k),r+1 = pi(l),1. Since (pi(0), . . . , pi(n)) is confusion-proof and
Ω({k, r}, {j, t}) = {l}, it follows from part 2 of Definition 2 that this is indeed the case.
Finally, suppose that (sl, pi
(j),t
−l ) = (sk, pi
(m),r
−k ), sk 6= pi(m),rk and sl 6= pi(j),t for some j,m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n},
k, l ∈ N and r, t ∈ N. Then f is well defined only if pi(l),1 = pi(k),1. Note that it must be that sl = pi(m),rl
and sk = pi
(j),t
k . Hence, pi
(m),r
l 6= pi(j),tl and pi(m),rk 6= pi(j),tk , implying that Ω({m, r}, {j, t}) = {k, l}.
Since (pi(0), . . . , pi(n)) is confusion-proof, it follows from part 3 of Definition 2 that pi(l),1 = pi(k),1.
It is clear that the strategy profile f = (f1 . . . , fn) has 1 – memory, since, by definition, fi depends
only on T (h) for all i ∈ N .
Note, also that f has the following property: pi(f) = pi(0) and if player i ∈ N deviates unilaterally
in phase t in any state j, then pi(i) will be played starting from period t + 1. Therefore, f defined
by (pi(0), . . . , pi(n)) is a 1 – memory simple strategy profile.
(Necessity) Let f be a 1 – memory simple strategy profile represented by (pi(0), . . . , pi(n)). Let i, j ∈
{0, . . . , n} and t, r ∈ N.
Suppose that Ω({i, t}, {j, r}) = ∅. Then, pi(i),t = pi(j),r. Let h1 = (pi(i),t) and h2 = (pi(j),r). Since
T (h1) = h1 = h2 = T (h2) and f has 1 – memory, we have f(h1) = f(h2). But then part 1 of
Definition 2 is satisfied because f(h1) = pi
(i),t+1 and f(h2) = pi
(j),r+1.
Suppose next that Ω({i, t}, {j, r}) = {k} for some k ∈ N . Then, pi(i),tl = pi(j),rl for all l 6= k, while
pi
(i),t
k 6= pi(j),rk . Consider sk = pi(i),tk and s¯k = pi(j),rk . Then, (sk, pi(j),r−k ) = pi(i),t and since f is a 1 –
memory simple strategy profile, it follows that pi(k),1 = f((sk, pi
(j),r
−k )) = f(pi
(i),t) = pi(i),t+1. Similarly,
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(s¯k, pi
(i),t
−k ) = pi
(j),r and so, pi(k),1 = f((s¯k, pi
(i),t
−k )) = f(pi
(j),r) = pi(j),r+1. Hence, pi(k),1 = pi(j),r+1 =
pi(i),t+1 and part 2 of Definition 2 is satisfied.
Finally, suppose that Ω({i, t}, {j, r}) = {k, l} for some k, l ∈ N . Then, pi(i),tm = pi(j),rm for all m /∈
{k, l}, while pi(i),tk 6= pi(j),rk and pi(i),tl 6= pi(j),rl . Consider sk = pi(j),rk and sl = pi(i),tl . Then, (sl, pi(j),r−l ) =
(sk, pi
(i),t
−k ) and since f is a 1 – memory simple strategy profile, it follows that pi
(l),1 = f((sl, pi
(j),r
−l )) =
f((sk, pi
(i),t
−k )) = pi
(k),1. Hence, by induction, pi(l) = pi(k) and part 3 of Definition 2 is satisfied.
Proof of Lemma 4. Condition 1 is clearly sufficient for confusion-proofness when the number
of players exceeds two. Similarly, in a game with two players, if (pi(0), pi(1), pi(2)) satisfies condi-
tions 2a and 2b, then for all i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2} and t, r ∈ N such that (i, t) 6= (j, r), it follows that
|Ω({i, t}, {j, r})| = 2, except when {i, j} = {1, 2} and t = r. Indeed, if {i, j} 6= {1, 2}, then
|Ω({i, t}, {j, r})| = 2 by 2b, whereas if {i, j} = {1, 2} and t 6= r, then pi(j),r = pi(i),r by 2a, and
so |Ω({i, t}, {j, r})| = |Ω({i, t}, {i, r})| = 2 by 2b. Finally, if {i, j} = {1, 2} and t = r, arguing as
above, we obtain that |Ω({i, t}, {j, r})| = |Ω({i, t}, {i, r})| = 0.
The above claim, together with condition 2a, imply that (pi(0), pi(1), pi(2)) is confusion-proof when
n = 2.
Proof of Theorem 7. Consider any η > 0 and any strictly enforceable SPE payoff vector u
described by (pˆi(0), . . . , pˆi(n)). For all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} and i ∈ N , define ζ(j)i by
ζ
(j)
i = inf
t∈N
V ti (pˆi(j))−
(1− δ) sup
si 6=pˆi(j),ti
ui(si, pˆi
(j),t
−i ) + δVi(pˆi
(i))
 .
Let γ be defined by
γ = min
{
η,
1
3
(
min
j∈{0,1,...,n},i∈N
{ζ(j)i }
)}
. (A.1)
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Since η > 0 and u is a strictly enforceable SPE payoff vector, it follows that γ > 0.
Let ψ > 0 be such that d(x, y) < ψ implies both that |ui(x) − ui(y)| < γ and |maxzi ui(zi, x−i) −
maxzi ui(zi, y−i)| < γ, for all i ∈ N . Since Si is perfect, it follows that for every i ∈ N , j =
0, 1, . . . n and t ∈ N, Bψ(pˆi(j),ti )∩ Si is uncountable. Thus, we can construct a simple outcome paths
(p¯i(0), p¯i(1), . . . , p¯i(n)) satisfying the conditions described in Lemma 4. Thus, (p¯i(0), p¯i(1), . . . , p¯i(n)) is
confusion-proof. Therefore, by Proposition 3, there exists a 1 – memory strategy profile f that is
represented by it. Moreover, γ ≤ η implies |Ui(f)− ui| = |Vi(p¯i(0))− Vi(pˆi(0))| < η for all i.
To complete the proof we need to show f is a strictly enforceable SPE. Fix any t ∈ N, i ∈ N and
j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}. Since V ti (pˆi(j)) − γ < V ti (p¯i(j)), Vi(p¯i(i)) < Vi(pˆi(i)) + γ and maxsi ui(si, p¯i(j),t−i ) <
maxsi ui(si, pˆi
(j),t
−i ) + γ, it follows from (A.1) that
V ti (p¯i
(j))− (1− δ) sup
si 6=p¯i(j),ti
ui(si, p¯i
(j),t
−i )− δVi(p¯i(i)) >
V ti (pˆi
(j))− (1− δ) sup
si 6=pˆi(j),ti
ui(si, pˆi
(j),t
−i )− δVi(pˆi(i))− 2γ ≥ ζ(j)i − 2γ ≥ 3γ − 2γ = γ.
Hence, any deviation by player i from the path induced by state (j) makes i worse off by a positive
amount γ. Thus, f is a 1 – memory strictly enforceable SPE.
Proof of Lemma 11. Let u ∈ ri(U).
Claim 13 There exists {s1, . . . , sK} ⊆ S and {λk}Kk=1 such that aff(U) = aff{u(s1), . . . , u(sK)},
u =
∑K
k=1 λ
ku(sk), λk > 0 for all k and
∑K
k=1 λ
k = 1.
Proof of Claim 13. Let m denote dim(U). First, we show that there exists a set of vectors
{u1, . . . , u2m} ⊆ U such that (i) u = ∑2mj=1 αjuj with αj > 0 for all j = 1, . . . , 2m and ∑2mj=1 αj = 1,
and (ii) {u1 − u2m, . . . , u2m−1 − u2m} spans L, where L is the unique subspace of Rn parallel to
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aff(U) (i.e., L = aff(U) + u¯ for all u¯ ∈ aff(U)).
To show this consider first the case where dim(U) = n. Since u ∈ ri(U) = int(U), there exists η > 0
such that B2η(u) ⊆ U . Let {e1, . . . , en} denote the standard basis of Rn, and define uj = u+ ηej for
all j = 1, . . . , n and uj = u− ηej for all j = n+ 1, . . . , 2n. Then, {u1 − u2n, . . . , u2n−1 − u2n} spans
Rn and u = ∑2nj=1 αjuj with αj > 0 for all j = 1, . . . , 2n and ∑2nj=1 αj = 1 (set αj = 1/2n for all
j). Next, consider the case where n = 2, U0 6= ∅ and dim(U) < 2. In this case dim(U) = 1, and so
aff(U) is a line. Thus, let u1 and u2 be points in U lying on opposite sides of u such that {u1 − u2}
spans L and u =
∑2
j=1 α
juj with αj > 0 for all j = 1, 2 and α1 + α2 = 1.
Since, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ 2m, uj ∈ U ⊆ co(u(S)), then there exist {s˜jk}Kjk=1 and {λ˜jk}Kjk=1 such that
uj =
∑Kj
k=1 λ˜
j
ku(s˜
j
k), s˜
j
k ∈ S, λ˜jk > 0 and
∑Kj
k=1 λ˜
j
k = 1. We then define K =
∑2m
j=1Kj, {s1, . . . , sK} =
∪2mj=1{s˜jk}Kjk=1 and {λ1, . . . , λK} = ∪2mj=1{αjλ˜jk}Kjk=1.
We finally show that {s1, . . . , sK} and {λ1, . . . , λK} satisfy the desired properties. First note that
u =
∑2m
j=1
(∑Kj
k=1 α
jλ˜kju(s˜
j
k)
)
=
∑K
k=1 λ
ku(sk), that λk > 0 for all k and
∑K
k=1 λ
k = 1.
Furthermore, aff(U) = aff({u(s1), . . . , u(sK)}). To see this, let u′ ∈ aff(U). Then, since {u1 −
u2m, . . . , u2m−1−u2m} spans L and L = aff(U)+u2m, then u′ = ∑2m−1j=1 θj(uj −u2m)+u2m for some
{θj}2m−1j=1 . Then, letting θ2m = 1 −
∑2m−1
j=1 θ
j, we obtain u′ =
∑2m
j=1 θ
juj =
∑2m
j=1 θ
j
(∑Kj
k=1 λ˜
k
ju(s˜
j
k)
)
,
∑2m
j=1 θ
j = 1 and
∑2m
j=1 θ
j
(∑Kj
k=1 λ˜
k
j
)
= 1. Conversely, note that u(sk) ∈ co(u(S)) ⊆ aff(U) for all k
and so aff({u(s1), . . . , u(sK)}) ⊆ aff(U). 2
For all γ ∈ R+, define Xγ = {w ∈ Rn : w = ∑Kk=1 µku(sk),∑Kk=1 µk = 1 and µk > λk − γ for all k}.
Claim 14 There exist 0 < ε < mink λk such that w ∈ Xε implies wi > vi + ε for all i ∈ N .
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Proof of Claim 14. Recall that u ∈ ri(U). We first show that u ∈ U0. This is clear when
dim(U) = n since in this case u− (ε, . . . , ε) ∈ U for some ε > 0. Consider next the case where n = 2
and U0 6= ∅. Let u′ ∈ U0. Then, since u ∈ ri(U), it follows by Rockafellar [24, Theorem 6.4] that
there exists µ > 1 such that µu + (1 − µ)u′ ∈ U and let ε = µ − 1 > 0. If ui = vi for some i, then
µui + (1− µ)u′i = ui + ε(ui − u′i) < vi, a contradiction. Hence, ui > vi for all i and so u ∈ U0.
Since u ∈ U0, there exists ζ > 0 such that u > v+2ζ where v = (v1, . . . , vn). Furthermore, X0 = {u}
and so it follows from the definition of Xγ that there exists γ
′ > 0 such that ‖w − u‖ < ζ for all
w ∈ Xγ′ . Since Xγ ⊆ Xγ′ for all γ ≤ γ′, it then follows that for any ε < min{ζ, γ′}, we have
w > v + ε for all w ∈ Xε. 2
Let δ′ ∈ (0, 1) be such that λk > (1− δ) + δ(λk − ε) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ K and δ ≥ δ′.
Claim 15 For all δ ≥ δ′, there exist sequences {wt}∞t=1 and pi = {pit}∞t=1 such that pi ∈ Πcp, w1 = u,
wt ∈ Xε and wt = (1− δ)u(pit) + δwt+1 for all t ∈ N.
Proof of Claim 15. Fix δ ≥ δ′. We next define, by induction, a sequence {wt}∞t=1 and {pit}∞t=1. Let
w1 = u and suppose that we are given w1, . . . , wt and pi
1, . . . , pit−1, with wl ∈ Xε for all 1 ≤ l ≤ t.
Since wt ∈ Xε, then wt = ∑Kk=1 µtku(sk) for some {µtk}k such that µtk ≥ λk−ε for all k and∑k µtk = 1.
Pick any 1 ≤ k¯ ≤ K such that µtk¯ ≥ λk¯.
Define a continuous function g : S → aff(U) by g(s) = (wt − (1 − δ)u(s))/δ. Since u(S) ⊆
aff(U) and wt ∈ aff(U), it follows that g(s) does indeed belong to aff(U). In particular, g(sk¯) =∑K
k=1(µ
t
k/δ)u(sk) − [(1 − δ)/δ]u(sk¯). Using the fact that µtk¯ ≥ λk¯, λk¯ > (1 − δ) + δ(λk¯ − ε) and
µtk ≥ λk − ε for all 1 ≤ k ≤ K, it is easy to check that µtk/δ > λk − ε for all k 6= k¯ and
µtk¯/δ − (1 − δ)/δ > λk¯ − ε. Thus, g(sk¯) ∈ ri(Xε) = {w ∈ Rn : w =
∑K
k=1 µku(sk),
∑K
k=1 µk =
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1 and µk > λk − ε for all k}.
Since ri(Xε) is open in aff(U) and g is continuous, there exists an open neighborhood Vi of sk¯i for
all i ∈ N , such that if pi = (pi1, . . . , pin) ∈ V1 × · · · × Vn, then g(pi) ∈ ri(Xε). Since S is perfect, then
Vi is uncountable for all i. Hence, choose pi
t ∈ V1× · · · × Vn such that piti 6= piri for all r < t (if t = 1,
we can let pi1 = sk¯). Finally, define wt+1 = g(pi
t) ∈ Xε.
The above construction of the two sequence {wt}∞t=1 and {pit}∞t=1 satisfy the conditions of the claim
because wt+1 = g(pi
t) imply that wt = (1− δ)u(pit) + δwt+1 and piti 6= piri for all i ∈ N and t, r ∈ N
with t 6= r imply that pi ∈ Πcp. 2
Finally, it follows easily by induction that u = (1 − δ)∑Tt=1 δt−1u(pit) + δTwT+1. Since wt ∈ Xε for
all t, it follows that {wt}∞t=1 is bounded. Therefore, δTwT+1 → 0 and so u = (1− δ)
∑∞
t=1 δ
t−1u(pit).
Similarly, wt = (1 − δ)∑∞k=t u(pik) = V t(pi, δ) and so V t(pi, δ) ∈ Xε for all t ∈ N. Since w ∈ Xε
implies that wi > vi+ ε for all i, we obtain V
t
i (pi, δ) > vi+ ε for all i ∈ N and t ∈ N. Since pi ∈ Πcp,
this completes the proof of Lemma 11.
Proof of Theorem 9. We consider the two cases of n ≥ 3 (Case A) and the n = 2 (Case B)
separately.
Case A: n ≥ 3 and dim(U) = n.
Let u ∈ ri(U) = int(U). It then follows by Lemma 11 that there exist δ′ ∈ (0, 1) and ζ > 0 such that
for all δ ≥ δ′ there exists pi(δ) ∈ Πcp such that u = V (pi(δ), δ) and V ti (pi(δ), δ) > vi + ζ. It follows
from Fudenberg and Maskin [14, Proposition 1] and its proof that there exists δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that
for all δ ≥ δ∗, there exists a strictly enforceable SPE simple strategy profile (pi(0), . . . , pi(n)) such that
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u = V (pi(0), δ) and pi(0) = pi(δ). Thus, by Proposition 2, there exists a 1 – memory simple strategy
profile f such that U(f, δ) = u.
Case B: n = 2 and U0 6= ∅.
Let u ∈ ri(U). It then follows by Lemma 11 that there exist δ′ ∈ (0, 1) and ζ > 0 such that for all
δ ≥ δ′ there exists piδ ∈ Πcp such that u = V (piδ, δ) and V ti (piδ, δ) > vi + ζ.
Finally, as in Fudenberg and Maskin [13, Theorem 1], there exists δ∗ ∈ (δ′, 1) and N∗ ∈ N such that
(1− δ∗)M + (δ∗)N∗+1 ui < ui − ζ (A.2)
and
(δ∗)N
∗+1 ui > vi (A.3)
for all i. Furthermore, for all δ ≥ δ∗, let N(δ) ∈ N be such that (A.2) and (A.3) hold for (δ,N(δ)).
The proof is now standard. Define a simple strategy profile by pi(0) = {piδ}∞t=1 and pi(1) = pi(2) defined
by
pi(1),t =

m¯ if 1 ≤ t ≤ N(δ),
pi
t−N(δ)
δ if t > N(δ).
That this simple strategy profile is a strictly enforceable SPE follows from (A.2) and (A.3) (corre-
sponding to (δ,N(δ))) as in Fudenberg and Maskin [13, Theorem 1]).
In conclusion, for all δ ≥ δ∗, there exists a strictly enforceable SPE simple strategy profile that
supports u. Thus, by by Proposition 2, there exists a 1 – memory simple strategy profile f such
that U(f, δ) = u.
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